Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek's address to the Senate on the placement of radar on the Czech Republic's territory, 27 November 2008 2008

Esteemed Mr. Chairman, Esteemed Madame Senator, Esteemed Senators. I promise you that today I appear here for the last time, but before you handle both prints, which have their applicants present in the form of Mr. Minister Schwarzenberg and Madam Minister Parkanová, I felt the need to create a certain introduction to the discussion, which in recent months and almost years has been very excited, and I would even say very ideologised. I have thought for a long time about what to say before you about the nearly two years of constant debate, and after dozens of speeches and appearances, it is truly not easy to find something new, new arguments. In the end, I said I would not use dozens of pages of base materials. I said that I would not speak sophisticatedly about all of the military, political, legal, health and additional arguments and aspects that speak in favour of the radar base. You will certainly hear these arguments today from the foreign minister and the defense minister. I will try instead to say something here for myself. I would like to talk about the reasons that led me toward fundamental support of anti-missile defense. I want to talk about my poltical, possibly statesmanlike and personal priorities. I will start with how the arguments and values really are, and whether they could be in play over the issue of the radar. I am not speaking only for myself in this, but also generally. Politically, there is a continuity of the foreign line and realism. The statesmanlike reasons for the radar are the defence of the country and the maintaining of commitments to our allies. And I will leave the personal motives for the end. The political arguments are arguments from the ground floor, arguments that I would say are basic, crucial, essential. That does not mean at all that they would be insufficient for a 'yes' vote in and of themselves, absent other motives. In foreign policy one most honour the principle of continuity, otherwise the country becomes untrustworthy and inscrutable. For this reason, we have continued with all foreign policy activities of the former government. In full, regardless of what we thought of some of them. I remember, for example, the highly disputable candidacy of a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council with well-known results. The radar was one of those inherited activities. When I speak about the need for continuity, I am thinking about the commitments that must be taken over by a new administration after the previous one. Because things can be considered logical, it stands to reason that an outgoing government naturally insist on what it started itself and that there is no special need to analyse it. Or is there? I am speaking here about politics, not factionalism, not about some lofty, idealised form of politics, but about politics worthy of the term. I am speaking about politicians who hold at least themselves and their word in high esteem when nothing else matters to them. But if we cannot honour continuity any more, then a realistic consideration offers itself. We are a member of NATO, and for our allies the anti-missile defense is an important priority. And the nomination of Mr. Gates to the post of Secretary of Defense is a signal of the continuity of this American policy and is a clear accession of the new administration. By refusing it we gain nothing but Moscow's momentary favour. On the other hand, we are not taking a risk with approval, because 2/3 of citizens are aware long-term of the importance of anti-missile defence and if the American radar is part of NATO, they are willing to accept it. The political points which can be gained through populism on the issue of the radar have only a limited and temporary importance. This issue is not even a priority for those who are against it. And a party that is not extremist and which counts on being in the government someday knows well that if they had to discuss a similar issue in the future they would say yes, even if they did not want to go into it twice. The opposite policy would mean calling into doubt our post-November development, doubt on our position as part of NATO with all the negative results for citizens, with unnecessary, risky, and possibly fatal results. So much then for the political arguments, which I consider fully relevant and adequate for the approval of the upcoming points. For me, though, those arguments are not the only ones. I consider it somewhat statesmanly to think beyond being merely being re-elected, or on the popularity rankings that come out every month. I consider it statesmanly to think here and now about the defence of our country and its citizens. While today's potential threat may become an acute threat in two or three election cycles, I will most likely be a political pensioner. I must say, that I cannot think of a stupider sentence than this, from a security standpoint: Nobody is threatening us today, so build the radar. There is maybe one an argument that's even stupider, which is that the anti-missile defence will serve only the USA. Not only is it not true, because the radar covers a large part of Europe, but even if it were true, it would mean that we would deny our ally assistance. Being an ally does not only mean taking, but also giving. Not just to consume security guarantees, but also to take part in common defence. So much, then, for the statesmanly arguments. I also promised you personal arguments. Arguments that are far more important for me. Like a number of you, I remember what it was like on 21 August 1968; that feeling of helplessness when the Soviet tanks rolled through. I remember that huge feeling of satisfaction when the last Russian soldier left on 30 June 1991, which was also a result of our now ally, the United States of America, winning the Cold War. Since then with Moscow we have had fair, equal, prospective, balanced ties both politically and in business - until very recently. Until the power of old Russian imperialism began to again gain strength. Until Moscow decided that it would try again to meddle in our affairs when it felt that we were not united, that we were losing our will for defence, that many people still have fear of Russian soldiers in their consciousness and this fear paradoxically could be used for Russia's neo-imperial ambitions. In Moscow they have also taken note of European anti-Americanism, and they have decided to drive a wedge into the Euro-Atlantic Alliance. It is absolutely unacceptable for me to become a Prime Minister who politely clicks his heels and opens the door again to Russian imperialism. I do not want to repeat the mistake of refusing the Marshall Plan, which confirmed Russia's right to decide for us. On the contrary, instead of Soviet nuclear rockets in the Brdy area, I want to have soldiers of the country who rid us of that slavery. That is the best guarantee that our sorrowful history will not be repeated. The Russians know well that the entire defence system is not and essentially could not be aimed against them. Russia itself has admitted that the anti-missile defence would bother them less if it were on the territory of NATO states other than Poland and the Czech Republic. This is clear evidence of imperial resentment, geopolitical connotations and interest in the sphere of influence. Our accession process into NATO and the European Union – and not just us, but other countries – is a symbol of the post-Tehran development of this part of Europe. The Warsaw Pact is a thing of the past and Moscow must respect this. Now that I have explained my arguments from the least important to the most important, I want at the very end to add a couple of sentences. I am aware that not everyone welcomes these arguments in the same way. And I understand that. I even understand that well. What I do not understand completely, as far as the top levels of Czech politics in the 21st century goes, is how someone could make it there without acknowledging even one of them. I can add only a couple of facts to all of these arguments. During its talks with the American side, the Czech government put through all its priorities. Thanks to our efforts, the radar and interceptors are now the basis of alliance considerations and NATO is not even considering another possibility than the anti-missile defence. The ratification of the agreement between the Czech Republic and the USA could have a fundamental influence on the alliance's ability to defend itself. As opposed to the USA, the European part of NATO is not protected today against ballistic missiles and has neither the technology nor the means to develop its own system in the foreseeable future. By building the third pillar therefore, the USA is helping European allies including ourselves, as the Bucharest summit clearly confirmed. NATO is preparing for its summit next year. It would be very good if we were to accept a clear decision that would help NATO in deciding next year on the continuing to build the architecture of anti-missile defence in NATO countries or in the European part of NATO. At this moment, we bear a relatively high amount of responsibility. Not only for the security of our country, but also for the security of our allies. I believe that in this historic moment, we will not disappoint, that we will live up to our commitments and convince others with statesmanlike wisdom. That we will successfully ratify the agreement with the USA and show that we are capable of bearing responsibility for the common defence. Given our historical experience, it would be utterly imprudent to act differently. Thank you for your attention.